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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 This dispute centers on the enforceability of a limitation 
of liability clause in a contract between a real estate developer 
(Valhal Corporation), and an architectural firm (Sullivan 
Associates). Valhal and Sullivan have both filed appeals from the 
order of the district court denying Sullivan's motion for partial 
summary judgment and granting Valhal's motion for partial summary 
judgment. The district concluded that the disputed clause was 
part of the contract but that it violated public policy and was 
therefore unenforceable.  We will reverse, and dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
 
 I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 Valhal is a New York corporation which specializes in the 
management and development of real estate. Sullivan Associates, 
Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation specializing in 
architectural, planning and engineering services.  In March of 
1989, Valhal became interested in buying a parcel of real estate 
located at 401 N. 21st Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
known as the "Channel 57 Property". Valhal planned to build a 
high-rise residential tower on a portion of that property. In 
early June of 1989, Valhal and Sullivan discussed the possibility 
  
of Sullivan performing certain work in connection with the 
project, including a feasibility study. 
 As a result of those discussions, Sullivan forwarded a  
proposal to Valhal, dated June 7, 1989, detailing the services 
which Sullivan would perform. A  document entitled "Standard 
Consulting Contract Terms and Conditions" was attached to the 
proposal and provided in part:  
  Enclosed you will find our Standard 
Consulting Contract Terms and Conditions 
which are hereby made a part of this 
proposal, as well as a copy of our Hourly 
Billing Rates for your knowledge.                                                                                    
We believe the above scope of services 
incorporates the elements discussed.  If you 
are in agreement with the terms of this 
proposal, we ask that you sign both copies 
and return one copy for our records.  At that 
time, a retainer in the amount of $1,000 is 
to be provided to Sullivan Associates, Inc. 
 
Paragraph 9 of the attached Standard Consulting Contract Terms 
and Conditions is at the heart of the current controversy. 
Paragraph 9 provided:  
 
  The OWNER agrees to limit the Design 
Professional's liability to the OWNER and to 
all construction Contractors and 
Subcontractors on the project, due to the 
Design Professional's professional negligent 
acts, errors or omissions, such that the 
total aggregate liability of each Design 
Professional shall not exceed $50,000 or the 
Design Professional's total fee for services 
rendered on this project.                                                                    
Should the OWNER find the above terms 
unacceptable, an equitable surcharge to 
absorb the Architect's increase in insurance 
premiums will be negotiated. 
 
  
The Standard Consulting Contract Terms and Conditions was signed 
by Andrew Sullivan as president of the company. 
 Sullivan's initial proposal provided that its services would 
be performed in two phases -- Phase "A" and Phase "B" -- and that 
Sullivan's total fee would be $5,000.  Valhal responded by 
requesting that a service to be performed under Phase "B" be 
included under Phase "A" and by requesting that two completely 
new services be added to Phase "A". Sullivan agreed and a new 
proposal was submitted to Valhal on June 22, 1989 in which 
Sullivan increased its fee from $5,000 to $7,000 because of the 
additional work it was to perform under Phase A.  This second 
proposal once again incorporated the Standard Contract Terms and 
Conditions, including the limitation of liability provision, and 
was again signed by Andrew Sullivan.    After reviewing the 
second proposal, Valhal requested another change to which 
Sullivan agreed. Sullivan then submitted a third proposal on July 
24, 1989, which also incorporated the Standard Contract Terms and 
Conditions, including the limitation of liability provision which 
remained unchanged and which was signed by Andrew Sullivan.  
Although Valhal never signed the proposal letter or the Standard 
Contract Terms and Conditions,   Valhal did fax a letter to 
Sullivan dated August 4, 1989 signed by Valhal’s Vice-President. 
That letter stated:  
  As per your conversation with my assistant 
this morning, we would like you to begin your 
study of the Channel 57 property as soon as 
possible. This letter will serve as 
authorization for you to initiate a 
feasibility study highlighting the 
possibility of the construction of a tower 
  
[on the property]. We would like your study 
to include engineering research, as well as 
estimation of construction costs, with 
similar structures such as Corman (sic) 
suites sited (sic) for comparison. 
 
Sullivan responded by performing the services outlined in the 
July 24, 1989 proposal, and thereafter provided a written report 
to Valhal in which Sullivan concluded that the Channel 57 
property was not burdened with any height restrictions and that 
it was possible to erect the tower on the property without any 
special governmental approvals.    
 Valhal thereafter entered into an Agreement of Sale for the 
purchase of the Channel 57 property.  However, after the sale 
contingencies expired, Valhal learned that the property was 
subject to a height restriction which would be violated by its 
building.  Nevertheless, Valhal proceeded to closing and paid the 
purchase price of $10.1 million.1  Valhal then brought a 
diversity action against Sullivan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 
seeking damages in excess of $2,000,000 for breach of contract, 
negligence, gross negligence and negligent misrepresentation 
based upon Sullivan’s failure to inform it of the height 
restriction.  
 Sullivan thereafter moved for partial summary judgment on 
the grounds that its liability was expressly limited to $50,000 
and that the district court therefore lacked diversity 
jurisdiction.  Valhal moved to strike the limitation of liability 
                     
 
   1Valhal asserts that it proceeded to sale in order to 
mitigate its damages. 
  
provision arguing that it was not a part of the contract and that 
even if it was, it was unenforceable.  Valhal also argued that 
the limitation of liability clause, if enforceable, was limited 
only to its claim for negligence and did not apply to its breach 
of contract claim or to its gross negligence claim.  The district 
court treated the parties' motions as cross-motions for summary 
judgment, denied Sullivan's motion, and granted Valhal's motion. 
The court ruled that the provision was part of the contract, but 
that it was against public policy as expressed in 68 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 491 (Purdons 1994) (the anti-indemnity statute) and 
therefore unenforceable.  See Memorandum and Order, dated May 17, 
1993.2  Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Associates, Inc., 1993 WL 175285 
(E.D. Pa. 1993).  
 Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Valhal 
on both the contract and negligence claims but awarded damages of 
$1,000,000 on the contract claim only.  The jury also concluded 
that Sullivan was not liable for gross negligence or negligent 
misrepresentation.  Sullivan's post-verdict motions were denied, 
and this appeal followed. 
 
 II. Discussion 
 Both Sullivan and Valhal now renew the arguments they made 
to the district court.  We will consider the parties' claims 
seriatim.   
                     
    
2
 The district court did not find the limitation of liability 
provision violated the Pennsylvania anti-indemnity statute.  It 
did hold, however, that the provision violated the public policy 
evidenced by that statute.   
  
 The standard of review applicable to a grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & 
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993).  "On review, the 
appellate court is required to apply the same test the district 
court should have utilized initially." Goodman v. Mead Johnson & 
Co., 535 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1038 (1977).  A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if 
the court determines "that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In determining if 
there is a genuine issue of material fact,  "[i]nferences . . . 
drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  The non-
movant's allegations must be taken as true and, when these 
assertions conflict with those of the movant, the former must 
receive the benefit of the doubt." Goodman, 534 F.2d at 573. 
 
 




  Although Valhal admits that it contracted with Sullivan, it 
relies primarily upon L.B. Foster Co. v. Tri-W Constr. Co., Inc., 
186 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1962), to argue that the provision limiting 
Sullivan's liability to $50,000 was not part of the contract.  
Valhal asserts that under L.B. Foster Co. such a provision cannot 
be enforced under Pennsylvania law without some specific 
manifestation of the consent of the party purportedly bound.  
  
Valhal further argues that since it neither signed the contract  
as requested in Sullivan’s proposals, nor manifested conscious 
consent to the limitation of liability, that clause never became 
part of the contract.  In L.B. Foster Co., the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that a warrant of attorney to confess judgment 
printed on the reverse side of a contract was not binding because 
it was not signed by the alleged promisor.  However, that holding 
does not assist our analysis.  A warrant of attorney to confess 
judgment has a "very special and significant status" which 
"confers. . . plenary power on the donee in respect of the 
adjudication of his[/her] own claims. . . ." Frantz Tractor Co., 
Inc., v. Wyoming Valley Nursery, 120 A.2d 303, 305 (Pa. 1956).  
  A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is 
perhaps the most powerful and drastic 
document known to civil law.  The signer 
deprives himself[/herself] of every defense 
and every delay of execution, he[/she] waives 
exemption of personal property from levy and 
sale under the exemption laws, he[/she] 
places his[/her] cause in the hands of a 
hostile defender.  The signing of a warrant 
of attorney is equivalent to a warrior of old 
entering a combat by discarding his shield 
and breaking his sword.  For that reason the 
law jealously insists on proof that his[/her] 
helplessness and impoverishment was 
voluntarily accepted and consciously assumed. 
 
Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa. 1953).  It was the 
draconian nature of a warrant of attorney to confess judgment 
which caused the court in L. B. Foster Co. to rule that  
a warrant of attorney to confess judgment 
must be self-sustaining and to be self-
sustaining the warrant must be in writing and 
signed by the person to be bound by it.  The 
requisite signature must bear a direct 
  
relation to the warrant of attorney and may 
not be implied. 
 
L. B. Foster Company, 186 A.2d at 20.   
 However, Pennsylvania courts have never generalized this 
rule to other types of contractual provisions.3  In Westinghouse 
Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d 656, 660-661 (Pa. 1967), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically declined to hold that an 
indemnity provision in an unsigned contract could not be enforced 
against the indemnitor-painting contractor.  There, the 
surrounding circumstances provided the necessary manifestation of 
consent to the terms of the contract including the indemnity 
provision even though the latter was only attached as an 
appendix.   
 Similarly, Pennsylvania law does not condition enforcement 
of a limitation of liability provision upon any specific form of 
consent, and an unsigned contract can include an enforceable 
agreement to limit liability if both parties manifest their 
approval of the terms.  This is true whether the clause at issue 
is an exculpatory clause, an indemnification clause or a 
limitation of liability clause. Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, 
                     
    
3A caveat is in order, however.  Certain contracts must be in 
writing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 33 P.S. §1 et seq.  
In addition, there are instances where diminutive type grossly 
disproportionate to that used in the remainder of a baggage claim 
check has been held to be ineffective to limit a common carrier's 
liability to a passenger for lost baggage without proof of the 
positive assent of the passenger.  This is the "subterfuge of 
fine print" first referred to in Verner v. Sweitzer, 321 Pa. 208 
(1858).  Of course, neither instance is applicable here.  
  
Inc.; Daniel Adams Assoc. Inc. v. Rimbach Publishing Co., 519 
A.2d 997, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1987).4   
[w]hen the parties have not only completed 
their arrangements but have actually 
completed the commercial relationship 
involved, notwithstanding the absence of 
definite written terms, a trier of fact is 
entitled to view the entire dealing and 
conclude that it indicated there was a 
contract with terms mutually understood 
between the parties. 
 
Caisson Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 622 F.2d 672, 678 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
 When the course of dealings between Valhal and Sullivan is 
viewed in the light most favorable to Sullivan,5 it is clear that  
Valhal consented to the Standard Consulting Contract Terms and 
Conditions (including the limitation of liability clause) that 
were attached to each proposal.  Valhal authorized Sullivan to 
proceed after reviewing each proposal containing those terms. In 
addition, Sullivan expressly invited Valhal to negotiate for a 
higher limit if Valhal found the conditions unacceptable. 
Valhal's only response was to fax a letter to Sullivan 
authorizing it to proceed. Therefore, the district court did not 
err in ruling that the limitation of liability clause was part of 
the contract between Valhal and Sullivan. 
 Valhal argues that the changes negotiated after the first 
proposal constituted a counter-offer that somehow caused the 
                     
     
4See discussion of the differences in these three types of 
clauses infra. 
     
5Goodman, 534 F.2d at 573. 
  
limitation of liability clause to disappear from the contract. 
However, those changes only addressed the services to be 
performed during various phases of the undertaking and did not 
constitute "a substituted bargain differing from that proposed by 
the original offer." Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §39(1). 
 Moreover, even if the changes requested by Valhal had 
constituted a counter-offer, the limitation of liability clause 
was nevertheless a part of any subsequent agreement as it was a 
part of each proposal which Sullivan tendered.  The district 
court thus properly concluded that Valhal's August 4, 1989 letter 
authorizing Sullivan to proceed constituted an acceptance of the 
limitation of liability contained in the standard consulting 
contract.  
  B. The Limitation of Liability Clause is Enforceable. 
 The heart of the instant controversy is Valhal's contention 
that the limitation of liability clause is unenforceable even if 
it is part of the contract with Sullivan.  Valhal argues that 
limitation of liability provisions are disfavored in Pennsylvania 
and that this particular clause violates a specific public policy 
against an architect limiting his/her liability for damages 
caused by his/her own negligence. 
  1. Pennsylvania Does Not Have a General Policy Against 
 Such Clauses. 
 
 The law recognizes different methods by which a party can 
limit his/her exposure to damages resulting from his/her 
negligent performance of a contractual obligation.  An 
exculpatory clause immunizes a person from the consequences of 
  
his/her negligence.  See, e.g., Topp Copy Products, Inc. v. 
Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 99 (Pa. 1993).  Similarly, an indemnity 
clause holds the indemnitee harmless from liability by requiring 
the indemnitor to bear the cost of any damages for which the 
indemnitee is held liable.6  See, e.g., Potts v. Dow Chemical 
Co., 415 A.2d 1220, 1221 (Pa. Super. 1980).  The instant clause 
has no such consequence.  The clause before us does not bar any 
cause of action, nor does it require someone other than Sullivan 
to ultimately pay for any loss caused by Sullivan's negligence. 
Sullivan remains liable for its own negligence and continues to 
be exposed to liability up to a $50,000 ceiling. Thus, the amount 
of liability is capped, but Sullivan still bears substantial 
responsibility for its actions.  Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 
112 U.S. 331, 5 S.Ct. 151, 154-156 (1884).   
 Valhal asserts that exculpatory clauses, indemnity clauses 
and limitation of liability clauses differ only in form as the 
effect of each is to limit one's liability for one's own 
negligence.  Brief of Valhal Corp. at 24-25.  Valhal contends 
that, thus, limitation of liability clauses are disfavored in 
Pennsylvania and must meet stringent standards to be enforceable. 
   There are similarities between these types of clauses.  
Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, Inc., 192 A.2d 682, 687 n.11 (Pa. 
                     
     
6Generally, an indemnity agreement also includes a "hold 
harmless" clause by which the indemnitor agrees "to indemnify and 
hold harmless" the indemnitee.  A hold harmless agreement is "A 
contractual arrangement whereby one party assumes the liability 
inherent in the undertaking, thereby relieving the other party of 
the responsibility." Black's Law Dictionary 658 (5th ed. 1979).    
  
1963).  Indeed, the test used to determine the enforceability of 
exculpatory and indemnity provisions is the same. Id.  Those 
clauses are disfavored and must meet certain conditions to be 
enforceable. First, the clause must not contravene public policy. 
Second, the contract must relate solely to the private affairs of 
the contracting parties and not include a matter of public 
interest. Third, each party must be a free bargaining agent. In 
addition, an exculpatory or indemnity clause will still not be 
enforced unless it is clear that the beneficiary of the clause is 
being relieved of liability only for his/her own acts of 
negligence.  The clause must be construed strictly and the 
contract must state the intention of the parties with the 
greatest particularity. Furthermore, any ambiguity must be 
construed against the party seeking immunity, and that party also 
has the burden of proving each of the prerequisites to 
enforcement.   Topp Copy Products, 626 A.2d at 99. The district 
applied this test to the limitation of liability clause at issue 
here. See Memorandum Opinion, 1993 WL 175285 at *3. 
 Courts have developed these limitations as reasonable 
conditions precedent to allowing a party to contract away 
responsibility for his/her negligence. It is with good reason 
therefore, that Pennsylvania allows such contractual provisions 
only where matters of public interest are not involved. One can 
not contract away responsibility to the public to exercise 
reasonable care in performing a contract. Topp Copy Products, at 
99. 
  
 However, Pennsylvania appellate courts recognize that there 
are differences between a contract which insulates a party from 
liability and one which merely places a limit upon that 
liability.  DeFrancesco v. Western Pa. Water Co., 478 A.2d 1295, 
1306 (Pa. Super. 1984).  The difference between the two clauses 
"is. . . a real one."  Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 
F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1976).  Presumably because of that 
difference, we find no Pennsylvania cases in which a limitation 
of liability clause has been disfavored or been tested by the 
same stringent standards developed for exculpatory, hold 
harmless, and indemnity clauses.  Accordingly, we believe that 
the district court erred in applying those stringent standards to 
the clause before us.  1993 WL 175285 at *3. 
 Limitation of liability clauses are routinely enforced under 
the Uniform Commercial Code when contained in sales contracts 
negotiated between sophisticated parties and when no personal 
injury or property damage is involved.  This is true whether the 
damages are pled in contract or tort.  See, e.g., New York State 
Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 924 
(Pa. Super. 1989) ("[U]nder Pennsylvania law, contractual 
provisions. . . excluding liability for special, indirect and 
consequential damages are generally valid and enforceable."); 13 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2719(c) (Purdons 1984) ("Limitation of 
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of 
damages where the loss in commercial is not," and such limitation 
is enforceble).  Such provisions have routinely been upheld in 
  
sales contracts of varying types.  See, e.g., LoBianco v. 
Property Protection, Inc., 598 A.2d 52, 54 (Pa. Super. 1985) 
(clause limiting liability of security alarm company upheld 
against owner whose home was burglarized); Wedner v. Fidelity 
Sec. Systems, 307 A.2d 429, 432 (Pa. Super. 1973) (alarm system 
installer's limitation of liability enforced against business 
operator); Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi & Sons, 162 A.2d 263, 
266 (Pa. Super. 1960) (manufacturer's limitation of liability 
enforced against buyer-contractor); Magar v. Lifetime, 144 A.2d 
747, 748 (Pa. Super. 1958) (alarm installer's limitation of 
liability enforced against private homeowner); see also Posttape, 
537 F.2d at 755 (film manufacturer's limitation of liability 
enforced against producer); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. 
Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974) (Manufacturer's 
limitation of liability upheld against buyer of used helicopters. 
"[F]reedom of contract should be permitted to allow a corporate 
purchaser to exercise its business judgment to forego claims for 
liability against the seller in exchange for a lower price."); 
Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685, 687-688 (3d Cir. 1953) 
(manufacturer's limitation of warranty enforced against buyer). 
  This tradition is codified at 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
2719(c) (Purdons 1984) which provides hat such provisions are 
generally enforceable.  Moreover, limitation of liability clauses 
have been upheld in contracts not governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  For example, in Behrend v. Bell Tel. Co., 242 
Pa. Super. 47, 72, n.16 (Pa. Super. 1976), (Behrend I), vacated 
on other grounds, 374 A.2d 536 (Pa. 1977), rev'd and remanded in 
  
accordance with prior opinion, 390 A.2d 233 (Pa. 1978), a 
business subscriber sued a telephone company for lost profits 
because the telephone company omitted the subscriber's paid 
Yellow Pages advertisement.  The advertising contract contained a 
provision limiting the telephone company's liability for an 
advertising omission to the monthly charge for each month 
omitted.  The court stated that the issue was one of first 
impression, but concluded "[w]e elect to join the majority of 
jurisdictions in upholding tariff limitations."  The court then 
cautioned: "[h]owever, the limitation in the tariff is not 
enforceable if the damage is caused by willful or wanton conduct 
by Bell. The weight of authority supports interpreting the tariff 
limitations to extend only to acts of ordinary negligence and 
exclude conduct found to be willful, malicious or reckless." 
Behrend, 363 A.2d at 1166. The court then ordered that the matter 
be remanded to determine if the omission was willful or 
malicious. "If appellant Bell's acts are found . . . not to be 
willful or malicious, . . . damages must be limited to a maximum 
of the amount specified in the [limitation] in the applicable 
tariff provision." Id. at 1167.  
 Pennsylvania courts have routinely enforced such limitation 
of damage provisions noting they are "[t]he subject of a private 
contract between the customer and the telephone company. . . ."  
Thus, the parties "[a]re at liberty to fashion the terms of their 
bargain." Vasilis v. Bell of Pa., 598 A.2d 52, 54 (Pa. Super. 
1991); see also Bash v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 601 A.2d 825, 830 
(Pa. Super. 1992). 
  
 We are persuaded that limitation of liability clauses are 
not disfavored under Pennsylvania law; especially when contained 
in contracts between informed business entities dealing at arm's 
length, and there has been no injury to person or property. 
Furthermore, such clauses are not subjected to the same stringent 
standards applied to exculpatory and indemnity clauses. 
Limitation of liability clauses are a way of allocating "unknown 
or undeterminable risks," K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. 1970), and are a fact of every-day 
business and commercial life. So long as the limitation which is 
established is reasonable and not so drastic as to remove the 
incentive to perform with due care, Pennsylvania courts uphold 
the limitation.   
 
Though it is possible that an agreement 
setting damages at a nominal level may have 
the practical effect of avoiding almost all 
culpability for wrongful action, the 
difference between the two concepts is 
nevertheless a real one. The distinction 
becomes more apparent in a situation which 
[sic] the damage level set is substantial 
rather than minimal, . . . 
  The line of demarcation between the two 
types of agreements has significance here 
because of the findings needed to establish 
their existence.  Pennsylvania permits 
parties to contractually relieve themselves 
from the consequences of negligent acts, but 
any agreement must spell out the intention of 
the parties with particularity. 
 
Posttape, 537 F.2d at 755. Here, Sullivan is exposed to liability 
which is seven times the amount of the remuneration under its 
contract with Valhal.  Accordingly, the cap does not immunize 
  
Sullivan from the consequences for its own actions. It is a 
reasonable allocation of risk between two sophisticated parties 
and does not run afoul of the policy disfavoring clauses which 
effectively immunize parties from liability.  
 
 Although it could be argued that the $50,000 limitation is 
nominal when compared to the final verdict, we do not believe 
that to be the proper measure. The inquiry must be whether the 
cap is so minimal compared to Sullivan’s expected compensation as 
to negate or drastically minimize Sullivan's concern for the 
consequences of a breach of its contractual obligations.   One 
can not seriously argue that a cap which leaves Sullivan exposed 
to damages that are seven times its expected fee insulates 
Sullivan from liability. 
 2. The Disputed Clause is not Contrary to the Policy 
Evidenced in 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 491.  
 
 In a related argument, Valhal contends that, even if the 
clause is not contrary to general public policy, it is contrary 
to the specific public policy prohibiting architects from 
entering into “hold harmless clauses.”  The district court agreed 
that such a policy is expressed in 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 491 
(Purdons 1994) which provides in part as follows: 
Every covenant, agreement or understanding . 
. . in connection with any contract or 
agreement made and entered into by owners, 
contractors, subcontractors or suppliers 
whereby an architect . . . or his[/her] 
agents . . . shall be indemnified or held 
harmless for damages. . . arising out of: (1) 
the preparation or approval by an architect . 
. . or his [/her] agents. . . of . . . 
opinions, reports, . . . or specifications, 
  
or (2) the giving or the failure to give 
directions or instructions by the architect . 
. . Or his[/her] agents. . . Shall be void as 
against public policy and wholly 
unenforceable. (emphasis added). 
 
 The district court reasoned that the contract between Valhal 
and Sullivan violated this policy and declared the contract void. 
The court ruled:  
It suffices to say that the Pennsylvania 
legislature has determined as a matter of 
public policy that indemnity and hold 
harmless clauses found in certain contracts 
involving architects are unenforceable and 
void.  Thus, whether or not the statute is 
directly applicable, it certainly establishes 
that a contract for professional 
architectural services is a matter of 
interest to the public, and that an 
exculpatory provision therein contravenes 
public policy. Accordingly, we find that 
under the common law of Pennsylvania that the 
limitation on liability clause found in 
Paragraph 9 is unenforceable. 
 
1993 WL 175285 at *3 (footnotes omitted).  In a footnote, the 
district court noted that section 491 may not be directly 
applicable as Valhal was not an "owner" at the time the contract 
was entered in to, and because "it is not clear from the literal 
language used by the Legislature whether it intended the term 
'indemnified or held harmless' to include a partial limitation or 
cap on damages." Id. at *3 n.2.  
 Similarly, Valhal does not argue that the limitation of 
liability provision in its contract falls within the statute. It 
does contend, however, that the district court correctly 
concluded that the statute expresses a public policy against 
  
architects attempting to contractually limit their liability.  We 
disagree.  
 As the district court correctly noted, the terms of the 
statute pertain only to indemnity and hold harmless provisions. 
We have already discussed the very real difference between such 
clauses and the one in the contract before us. Those differences 
preclude an assumption that a statute expressing a prohibition 
against indemnity and hold harmless provisions announces a public 
policy against something as distinct and accepted as limitation 
of liability clauses. Indeed, the contrary precedent which we 
have discussed above convinces us that such an assumption has the  
practical effect of amending this statute.  
 However, even if we assume that the public policy expressed 
by the statute extends to limitation of liability clauses, the 
statute still would not apply here. The district court quite 
correctly noted that the contract between Valhal and Sullivan is 
not between an architect and an "owner," but between an architect 
and a "developer".  "When the words of a statute are clear and 
free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."  1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(b) (Purdons 1994).  Had the legislature 
intended this provision to apply to contracts between architects 
and developers, it clearly could have said so.  We can not 
interpret the statute to apply to developers (or to limitation of 
liability clauses) unless we stretch its language or implication 
beyond the boundaries of the actual statute.  See Strunack v. 
Ecker, 424 A.2d 1355, 1357 (Pa. Super. 1981) (where certain 
  
things are specifically designated in a statute all omissions 
should be understood as exclusions).  We decline Valhal's 
subliminal invitation to judicially amend this statute. 
 We are also unpersuaded by Valhal's argument that public 
policy precludes licensed professionals from limiting their 
liability for their own negligence.  In support of this argument 
Valhal relies on a line of non-Pennsylvania cases which have held 
that public policy prohibits physicians and attorneys from 
contractually exculpating themselves from all liability for 
malpractice.   Brief of Valhal, at 31-36.  
 We have already noted that the contract before us does not 
relieve Sullivan of all liability for malpractice. In addition, 
this contract does not involve an agreement between a 
professional and an unsuspecting consumer. Nor does it involve an 
agreement between a client and attorney, or a patient and 
physician. Such contracts involve fiduciary relationships that 
are given special protection even to the extent of affording 
certain communications between such parties a testimonial 
privilege.7   
                     
     
7
 See, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5916 (Supp. 1994) ("In a 
criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or permitted 
to testify to confidential communications made to him[/her] by 
his[/her] client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose 
the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the 
trial by the client"); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5928 (Supp. 
1994) ("In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or 
permitted to testify to confidential communications made to 
him[/her] by his[/her] client, nor shall the client be compelled 
to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is 
waived upon trial by the client."); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
5929 (Supp. 1994) ("No physician shall be allowed, in any civil 
matter, to disclose any information which he[/she] acquired in 
  
 Here, an architectural firm and real estate developer have 
attempted to allocate risks between themselves in such a way that 
neither is relieved from liability for its own negligence.  We 
see no reason to hold that the policy enunciated in section 491 
precludes them from doing so. Valhal’s argument to the contrary 
would more properly be addressed to the Pennsylvania legislature. 
 Nor can we conclude that the enactment of section 491 
elevates a private contract involving an architect to a matter of 
public concern. In order for a contractual provision to violate 
public policy the provision must involve a matter of interest to 
the public or the state.  Seaton v. East Windsor Speedway, Inc., 
582 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. Super. 1990).  In Seaton, a member of a 
speedway pit crew at a speedway was killed when a car crashed 
into a guardrail during a race. The decedent's estate sued the 
speedway alleging negligence, and the speedway moved for summary 
judgment based upon the release which the worker had signed which 
provided that the worker "releases, waives, discharges and 
covenants not to sue the [defendant]" in return for the worker 
being allowed to enter certain restricted areas. The Superior 
Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment against 
an argument that the release violated public policy. The court 
noted: 
Appellant's argument that the Release 
violates public policy is without merit. 
(..continued) 
attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was 
necessary to enable him[/her] to act in that capacity, which 
shall tend to blacken the character of the patient, without 
consent of said patient, except in civil matters brought by such 
patient, for damages on account of personal injuries.")  
  
Contracts against liability, although not 
favored by courts, violate public policy only 
when they involve a matter of interest to the 
public or the state. Such matters of interest 
to the public or state include the employer-
employee relationship, public service, public 
utilities, common carriers, and hospitals. 
 
Id. at 1382.  In addition, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
stated that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §195(2)(b) 
(1981) "is a correct statement of the public policy of the 
Commonwealth."  See DeFrancesco v. Western Pa. Water Co., 478 
A.2d at 1306.8  Section 195(2)(b) of the Restatement provides: 
  (2) A term exempting a party from tort 
liability9 for harm caused negligently is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
if... 
  (b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of  
  public service from liability to one to whom 
that duty is owed for compensation for breach 
of that duty. 
 In DeFrancesco, property owners sued a water company 
alleging that its failure to provide adequate water pressure 
prevented a fire from being brought under control before it 
spread to their property. The water company moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the tariff which it had filed with 
the Public Utility Commission excluded such liability. The 
                     
 
8
 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had the occasion 
to adopt this section of the Restatement as expressing the public 
policy of the Commonwealth, we may consider pronouncements of 
state intermediate appellate courts as an indication of how the 
state's highest court would rule.  Adams v. Cuyler, 592 F.2d 720, 
725 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 433 (1981). 
9
 Although the Restatement speaks in terms of "tort liability" 
and the instant controversy involves contract liability, we do 
not believe the distinction alters our analysis here. See 
discussion, infra. 
  
applicable portion of that tariff provided that the water company 
"shall not in any way or under any circumstances be held 
responsible . . . for any deficiency in the pressure, . . . or 
supply of water due to any cause whatsoever."  478 A. 2d at 1305. 
In finding that this provision did not insulate the water company 
from damages for negligence the court first noted that prior case 
law (including Behrend I ) did not control. The court stated 
"[t]his case, however, is not governed by our holding and 
reasoning in Behrend I. For while Behrend I involved what was 
clearly a limitation of liability, this case involves what is 
just as clearly an exculpatory clause." DeFrancesco, 478 A.2d at 
1306.10  
 The limitation clause in the contract between Sullivan and 
Valhal is similar to the clause in Behrend I in that it provides 
a reasonable allocation of risks between private parties without 
insulating the beneficiary of the clause from liability.  Since 
Pennsylvania courts allow a public utility to contractually limit 
its liability in a matter involving the Public Utilities 
Commission we fail to see how Pennsylvania public policy 
prohibits the instant limitation clause. 
 Valhal also argues that Pennsylvania's licensure requirement 
for architects evidences a public interest in the private 
contracts of architects. See Brief of Valhal Corp. at 31-36. 63 
                     
     
10
 We note that the court in DeFrancesco and Behrend 
discussed the relevance of the Public Utility Commission's duty 
to assess the reasonableness of such tariff provisions. However, 
we do not feel that role played by the PUC lessens the relevance 
of those cases to the facts before us here. 
  
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 34.3 (Purdons 1994) does provide that the 
purpose of the licensure requirement for architects is to  
"protect the health, safety and property of people of the 
Commonwealth. . . and to promote their welfare. . . ."  However, 
that requirement, without more, cannot convert a private dispute 
into a matter of public concern.  Frampton v. Dauphin 
Distribution Servs. Co., et. al., 648 A.2d 236 (Pa. Super. 1994).  
In Frampton, two workers were electrocuted when scaffolding 
contacted overhead power lines during a construction job. Their 
estates sued the contractor and the architectural firm it had 
contracted with. The architectural firm had prepared the 
construction drawings, but had limited its obligation to 
preparation of documents. Plaintiffs maintained that the 
architectural firm had been negligent in failing to warn of the 
overhead power lines, or to take any steps to minimize the 
danger.  In upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the architectural firm, the Superior Court noted 
Pennsylvania courts . . . have refused to 
impose a duty on an architect to protect 
workers from hazards on a construction site 
in the absence of an undertaking by the 
architect, either by contract or course of 
conduct, to supervise and/or control the 
construction and to maintain safe conditions 
on the construction site. 
 
Id. at 328.   
 Accordingly, we conclude that Pennsylvania law does not 
charge Sullivan with any generalized duty to the public which 
could elevate its private contracts to matters of public concern. 
Valhal suggests that "[t]here is a clear public interest in 
  
regulating professionals and their dealings with the public that 
prevents professionals from limiting their liability under the 
stringent standards set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
See Employers Liability Assurance,. . . 224 A.2d at 622-23 
(1966)."  Brief of Valhal at 32. However, in pressing this point 
Valhal persists in failing to accord proper significance to the 
difference between the "stringent standards" established for 
exculpatory clauses, and the policy favoring reasonable 
limitation of liability clauses which "strik[e]. . . a balance of 
'benefits and burdens.'" Behrend I, 363 A.2d at 1165. The clause 
in Employer's Liability Assurance provided that "[The owner] 
shall not be responsible . . . for any damages occurring to the 
property of [Lesee]".  224 A.2d at 621. Thus, that clause was 
remarkably like the one in DeFrancesco.  It is just as surely not 
like the clause in Behrend I or the one before us. 
  
 III. The Limitation Provision Can Not Be Limited to the 
  Negligence Claim.  
 The jury found Sullivan liable on both the negligence and 
the breach of contract claims, but awarded damages only on the 
contract claim.  Valhal contends that even if the limitation of 
liability provision is enforceable, it applies only to its 
negligence action and not its breach of contract action.   
 Valhal attempts to draw support for this argument from a 
decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court which concerned a 
limitation of liability clause almost identical to the clause 
here.  Brief of Valhal, at 22-24.  In W. William Graham, Inc. v. 
  
Cave City, 709 S.W.2d 94 (Ark. 1986), a city sued a design 
engineer for damages for breach of contract in connection with 
the preparation of plans for a wastewater treatment facility.  
The design engineer contended that the contract contained a valid 
and enforceable limitation of liability clause which prohibited 
the city from recovering more than $99,214, which was his total 
fee for the project.  The limitation of liability clause 
provided: 
  The OWNER agrees to limit the ENGINEER'S 
liability to the OWNER and to all 
Construction Contractors and Subcontractors 
on the Project, due to ENGINEER'S 
professional negligent acts, error or 
omissions, such that the total aggregate 
liability of the ENGINEER to those named 
shall not exceed Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000.00) or the ENGINEER'S total fee for 
services rendered on this project, whichever 
is greater. 
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not decide the 
enforceability of this provision.  Instead, it held that the 
clause  only covered the engineer's negligence and was not 
applicable to any damages which resulted from a breach of 
contract. Id. at 96.  
 However, the contract at issue stated that the engineer was 
to provide the plans to the city within 135 days, and it was 
clear that time was of the essence because delay would result in 
a substantial reduction of the city's funding for the project.  
Despite the fact that both the city and the engineer clearly 
understood that time was of the essence of the contract, the 
  
engineer did not have the plans ready on time and the city lost 
in excess of $300,000 in funding. Id. at 95.    
 There were no allegations that the engineer was 
professionally negligent in his preparation of the plans or that 
the plans themselves were defective. Accordingly, the engineer  
could not assert the provision which limited his liability for 
negligently performing the contract. 
 
 Under Pennsylvania law there are two separate lines of 
reasoning employed by courts in determining whether a cause of 
action, although arising from a contractual relationship, should 
be brought in contract or in tort.  The first line comes from the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion in Raab v. Keystone Ins. 
Co., 412 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super. 1979), which involved a claim that 
the insurance company negligently failed to pay benefits under a 
no-fault automobile insurance policy and that an agent of the 
company maliciously interfered with the contractual relationship 
between the policyholder and the carrier.  The court wrote: 
     Generally, when the breach of a 
contractual relationship is expressed in 
terms of tortious conduct, the cause of 
action is properly brought in assumpsit and 
not in trespass.  However, there are 
circumstances out of which a breach of 
contract may give rise to an actionable tort.  
The test used to determine if there exists a 
cause of action in tort growing out of a 
breach of contract is whether there was an 
improper performance of a contractual 
obligation (misfeasance) rather than a mere 
failure to perform (nonfeasance). 
 
  
Id. at 187-88.  Under the Raab line of reasoning, if there has 
been a complete failure to perform a contract, the action lies in 
assumpsit, while if there has been an improper performance, the 
action lies in tort.  See also Hirsh v. Mount Carmel Dist. Indus. 
Fund, Inc., 526 A.2d 422, 423 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 1987).    Under 
the second line, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is not 
pursued.  Rather, the nature of the wrong ascribed to the 
defendant "[is] the gist of the action, the contract being 
collateral." Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine, and Inland Ins. 
Company, 623 A.2d 933, 935 n. 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (quoting 
Closed Circuit Corp. v. Jerrold Elec., 426 F. Supp. 361, 364 
(E.D. Pa. 1977)).  Thus, if the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
would traditionally be characterized as a tort, then the action 
sounds in tort and not in contract.  
 Here, Sullivan's omission of the height restriction was 
undoubtedly professional negligence, and all of Valhal's damages 
flowed from that negligence.  Sullivan did not totally fail to 
perform (nonfeasance). Rather, in performing, it negligently 
omitted the height restriction (misfeasance). Valhal bottomed its 
negligence and breach of contract counts on that omission.  If 
Sullivan's conduct is viewed under either the 
"misfeasance/nonfeasance" theory or "gist of the action" theory, 
the result in the same.  Although Valhal crafted a count against 
Sullivan in contract, Valhal suffered its loss because of 
Sullivan's negligence.  Thus, Valhal can not escape the terms of 
its own contract by attempting to recast the theory of its case 
so as to avoid the limitation of liability clause. 
  
 IV. 
 The jurisdiction of the district court was based solely on 
diversity.  Diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in 
controversy in excess of $50,000 excluding fees and costs.  28 
U.S.C. §1332(a).  "This provision must be narrowly construed so 
as not to frustrate the congressional purpose behind it: to keep 
the diversity caseload of the federal courts under some modicum 
of control." Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 
1044-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 440 
(1993).  Because we have concluded that the limitation of 
liability clause is an enforceable part of the contract which is 
the basis of this diversity action, Valhal's maximum possible 
recovery is $50,000.   Therefore, the district court was without 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this controversy.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the district court and 
remand with directions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
